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Madras High Court

Narayanan vs The State Of Tamil Nadu Rep on 9 December, 2011

Author: Elipe Dharma Rao

Bench: Elipe Dharma Rao, D. Hariparanthaman

       

  

  

 
 
 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED  :   09-12-2011

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ELIPE DHARMA RAO
AND
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D. HARIPARANTHAMAN 

W.A.Nos.849, 1348 to 1355 of 2009
W.P.NOs.10173 & 20487 of 2010
and 
Connected Miscellaneous Petitions

W.A.Nos.849 of 2009

Narayanan
S/o. Rajagopal						..  Appellant

			Vs.

1. The State of Tamil Nadu rep.
      by its Secretary,
    CT & RE Department,
    Fort St.George, Chennai-9.

2. The Commissioner,
    T.N.HR & CE Department,
    Chennai-34.

3. The Joint Commissioner,
    T.N. HR & CE Administration
    Department, Chennai-34.

4. The Executive Officer,
    Madhavaperumal Temple,
    Mylapore, Chennai-4.				..  Respondents




W.A.Nos.1348 to 1355 of 2009

Dr.M. Balamuralikrishna
S/o.late Pattabiramayya			..  Appellant in WA.1348/09

Rajendra Mudaliar
S/o.late Major A.P. Sivaprakasam		..  Appellant in WA.1349/09

S. Peter Alphonse,
S/o. Swaminathan				..  Appellant in WA.1350/09

T.C.A. Shrinivasan
S/o.late T.C.A. Anandalvar			..  Appellant in WA.1351/09

K. Kuppusamy
S/o.late Krishnaswamy				..  Appellant in WA.1352/09

Sulochana Sadasivam				..  Appellant in WA.1353/09

M.L. Gupta						..  Appellant in WA.1354/09

Jitendra Sharma					..  Appellant in WA.1355/09

			Vs.

1. The Commissioner,
    T.N.HR & CE Department,
    Chennai-34.

2. The Joint Commissioner,
    T.N. HR & CE Administration
    Department, Chennai-34.

3. The Assistant Commissioner,
    T.N.HR & CE Administration
    Department, Chennai-34.

4. The Executive Officer,
    Madhavaperumal Temple,
    Mylapore, Chennai-4.


5. The Inspector,
    T.N.Hindu Religious and Charitable
    Endowments, Administration Dept,
    Chennai-34.

6. State of Tamil Nadu, rep.by
    Secretary, Commercial Taxes and
    Religious Endowments, Secretariat,
    Chennai-9.

7. Secretary to Government of T.N.
    Law Department, Secretariat,
    Chennai-9.

W.P.No.10173 of 2010

Federation of Tamil Nadu Hindu 
   Religious Temples,
House sites Leaseholders Associations
Regd.No.371 of 2007
Rep. by its President
N. Elumalai						..  Petitioner 

		Vs.

1. State of Tamil Nadu, rep.by
    Secretary, CT & RE Department,
    Fort St. George,,
    Chennai-9.

2. The Joint Commissioner,
    HR & CE Department,
    Chennai-34.

3. The Assistant Commissioner,
    HR & CE Department, 
    Chennai-34.					..  Respondents

W.P.No.20487 of 2010

R. Jothi
S/o.V. Raju						..  Petitioner 

		Vs.

1. State of Tamil Nadu, 
    rep.by its Secretary, 
    H.R. & C.E. Department,
    Fort St. George,   Chennai-9.

2. The Commissioner,
     H.R. & C.E. Department,
     Nungambakkam High Road,
    Chennai 600 034.

3. The Joint Commissioner,
     H.R. & C.E. Department,
     Nungambakkam High Road,
    Chennai 600 034.

4. Chennai Arulmighu Ekambareswarar
        Thirukkoil,
    Rep. by its Executive Officer,
    No.315, Mint Street,
    Chennai 600 003.					..  Respondents

	The Writ Appeals are filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the common order of the learned single Judge, dated 28.10.2008, in W.P.Nos.10447 of 1999 & etc., batch.

	W.P.No.10173 of 2010 is filed to for a writ of declaration to declare that Section 79(3) of the Tamil Nadu H.R. & C.E. Act is repugnant to Section 79(2) of the Act and also unconstitutional and also to declare the provisions contained under Sections 78 and 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 22 of 1959 as amended Act 39 of 1996 as well as amended by Act 28 of 2003 as ultra vires of the Constitution of India and null and void in so far as the petitioner's Association is concerned.

	W.P.No.20487 of 2010 is filed for a Writ of Declaration declaring the provisions under Section 78 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1996 as unconstitutional and ultra vires.



		For Appellants in		:  Mr.T.V. Ramanujan
		W.A.Nos.1348 to		  Senior Counsel for 
		   1355/2009		  M/s.T.C.A. Shrinivasan &
						  T.C.A. Vijay Ananth

		For Appellant in
		W.A.No.849/2009	:  Ms. Chitra Sampath

		For Petitioner in		:  M/s.V. Raghupathi &
		W.P.No.10173/2010		G. Devi

		For Petitioner in		:  Mr.T.L. Rammohan
		W.P.No.20487/2010	   Senior Counsel for 
						   Ms.G. Sumitra

		For Respondent-State	:  Mr.V. Ramasamy
		& H.R. & C.E.,		    Addl. Advocate General for
						   Mr.T. Chandrasekar
						   Special Govt. Pleader (HR&CE)

		For R4 in WA.849/09	:  Mr.K. Chandrasekaran
		& WA.Nos.1348 to
		1355/2009

		For R4 in W.P.No.
		20487/2010		:  Mr.S.D. Ramalingam
---

COMMON JUDGMENT

ELIPE DHARMA RAO, J The issue involved in all these matters is being intrinsically inter-connected, all were heard together and disposed of by this common judgment.

2. In all these matters the challenge is with regard to constitutional validity of Sections 78, 79(3) and 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Act 22 of 1959) (in short "the HR & CE Act") as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 39 of 1996 as well as by amended Act 28 of 2003 as ultra vires the Constitution of India.

3. The appellants and the petitioner in W.P.No.20487 of 2010 claim to be the tenants / lessees in occupation of the land belonging to the Temple concerned for the past several years. According to the appellants / petitioner, while they are in lawful occupation, the authorities of the HR & CE Department had issued notice purported to be under Section 78(2) of the HR & CE Act to show cause as to why they should not be evicted. Admittedly, without offering any objections as contemplated in Section 78(4), the appellants as well as the petitioners have approached this Court to declare the various provisions of the HR & CE Act as unconstitutional.

3. Ms. Chitra Sampath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in W.A.No.849 of 2009 contended that the procedure contemplated under Section 78(1) and (4) is arbitrary and the authorities at their whims and fancies can evict any person out of possession. She has also contended that the Joint Commissioner has no jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 78(2) as the appellants are not encroachers. She has further contended that that prevention of moving the Civil Court under Section 79(2) has been curtailed by Section 79(3), which is illegal and it is liable to be struck down.

4. Mr.T.V. Ramanujan, learned Senior Counsel submitted that though he is not appearing for the encroachers he is appearing for the persons who are lessees, licencees or mortgagees or whose lease were not renewed. He has specifically contended that the power granted under Section 109 of the HR & CE Act, excluding the Limitation Act, 1963, would result in all old issues being raked up and, therefore, it has to be held as unconstitutional.

5. Mr.V. Raghupathi, the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.10173 of 2010, submitted that the bar under Section 79(3) to approach the Civil Court in grant of injunction against the order of the Joint Commissioner is bad and should be interfered with.

6. Mr.T.L. Rammohan, Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.20487 of 2010 would contend that the procedure contemplated under Sections 78 and 79 in Chapter VII relates to encroachments and, since the possession of the petitioner by the Department is admitted, instead of issuing notice under Section 78(2), the procedure contemplated under Section 34 should have been followed. In support of such contention, he has placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 2007(4) MLJ 1002 (C. Sathish Kumar v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, Chennai and others).

7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the materials placed on record.

8. The Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959) has received the assent of the President on 19.11.1959 and was first published in the Gazettee on 2.12.1959. The object of the Act is to amend and consolidate the law relating to the administration and governance of Hindu Religious and Charitable Institutions and Endowments in the State of Tamil Nadu.

7.1. The said Act was further amended by Tamil Nadu Act No.25/2003 after receiving the assent of the Governor on 1st July, 2003. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of such amended Act is as follows :-

"Statement of Objects and Reasons - The ground rent charged for the temple lands given on long term leases is abnormally low when compared to the present market rental values. The low rent and the absence of any periodical revision have adversely affected the income of the temples. Consequently, the maintenance of the temples and the performance of poojas, etc. have also been affected. Further, in the vacant lands belonging to religious institutions, the lessees have put up permanent structures with or without the permission of the authorities of the institutions. At present there is no specific provision in the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959) to increase the lease rent and to take action against lessees when they refuse to pay the revised lease rent. The Government have, therefore, decided to amend the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959) so as to make provisions to constitute a committee to determine and fix the lease rent payable for the lease of immovable property of religious institutions, to terminate the lease if the occupant refuses to pay the enhanced rent and to pay compensation to the lessee for the buildings, etc., erected in accordance with the terms of agreement or with the permission of the appropriate authority, on such termination of lease."

8. From a reading of the Statements of Objects and Reasons, the Legislature taking into consideration the various factors including the fact that the ground rent charged for the temple lands given on long term leases is very low, the lessees have put up permanent structures on the temple land and that there is no specific provision in the Act to increase the lease rent and to take action against lessees when they refuse to pay the revised lease rent.

9. Since Sections 78, 79 and 109 of the HR & CE Act have been under challenge, those provisions are extracted hereunder :-

''78. Encroachment by persons on land or building belonging to charitable or religious institution or endowment and the eviction of encroachers.- (1) Where the Assistant Commissioner having jurisdiction either suo motu or upon a complaint made by the trustee has reason to believe that any person has encroached upon (hereinafter in this section referred to as ''encroacher) any land, building, tank, well, spring or water-course or any space wherever situation belonging to the religious institution or endowment (hereinafter referred to as ''the property), he shall report the fact together with relevant particulars to the Joint Commissioner having jurisdiction over the division in which the religious institution or endowment is situated.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, the expression ''encroacher shall mean any person who unauthorisedly occupies any tank, well, spring or water-course or any property and to include-
(a) any person who is in occupation of property without the approval of the competent authority (sanctioning lease or mortgage or licence) and
(b) any person who continues to remain in the property after the expiry or termination or cancellation of the lease, mortgage or licence granted to him.
(2) Where, on a perusal of the report received by him under sub-section (1), the Joint Commissioner finds that there is a prima facie case of encroachment, he shall cause to be served upon the encroacher a notice specifying the particulars of the encroachment and calling on him to show cause before a certain date why an order requiring him to remove the encroachment before the date specified on the notice should not be made. A copy of the notice shall also be sent to the trustees of the religious institution or endowment concerned.
(3) The notice referred to in sub-section (2) shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed.
(4) Where after considering the objections, if any, of the encroacher received during the period specified in the notice referred to in sub-section (2) and after conducting such inquiry as may be prescribed, the Joint Commissioner is satisfied that there has been an encroachment, he may by order and for reasons to be recorded, require the encroacher to remove the encroachment and deliver possession of the property (land or building or space) encroached upon to the trustee before the date specified in such order.
(5) During the pendency of the proceeding, the Joint Commissioner shall order the encroacher to deposit such amount as may be specified by him in consideration of the use and occupation of the properties in question in the manner prescribed.

79. Mode of eviction on failure of removal of the encroachment as directed by the Joint Commissioner.- Where within the period specified in the order under sub-section (4) of section 78, the encroacher has not removed the encroachment and has not vacated the property, the Assistant Commissioner having jurisdiction over the division may remove the encroachment and obtain possession of the property encroached upon, taking such police assistance as may be necessary. Any Police Officer whose help is required for this purpose shall render necessary help to the Assistant Commissioner.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent any person aggrieved by the order of the Joint Commissioner under sub-section (4) of section 78 from instituting a suit in a Court to establish that the religious institution or endowment has no title to the property.

Provided that no Civil Court shall take cognizance of any suit instituted after six months from the date of receipt of the order under sub-section (4) of section 78.

Provided further that no such suit shall be instituted by a person who is let into possession of the property or who is a lessee, licensee or mortgagee, of the religious institution or endowment.

(3) No injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Joint Commissioner under section 78.

79-A. Encroachment by group of persons on land belonging to charitable religious institutions and their eviction.- (1) Where the Joint Commissioner knows or has reason to believe that a group or groups of persons without any entitlement and with the common object of occupying any land, which is the property belonging to a charitable or religious institution or endowment, are occupying or have occupied any such land and if such group or groups of persons have not vacated the land on demand by the Joint Commissioner or any officer authorised by him in this behalf, the Joint Commissioner shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, order after giving due notice, the immediate eviction of the encroachers from the land and the taking of possession of the land and thereupon, it shall be lawful for any officer authorised by the Joint Commissioner in this behalf to evict the encroachers from the land by force, taking such police assistance as may be necessary and take possession of the land. Any police officer whose help is required for this purpose shall be bound to render the necessary help to the Joint Commissioner or to such officer authorised by him.

(2) Where, in any proceedings taken under this section, or in consequence of anything done under this section, a question arises as to whether any land is the property of the charitable or religious institution or endowment, such land shall be presumed to be the property of the charitable or religious institution or endowment until the contrary is proved by the encroacher.

(3) Any order of eviction passed by the Joint Commissioner under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court.

79-B. Penalty for offences in connection with encroachment.- (1) No person, on or after the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Amendment) Act, 1996 (Tamil Nadu Act 39 of 1996) shall occupy, otherwise than by lawful possession, any property belonging to a charitable or religious institution or endowment.

(2) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1), shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.

(3) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sub-section (2) except on the complaint in writing of the Commissioner.

(4) No offence punishable under sub-section (2) shall be inquired into or tried by any Court inferior to that of a Judicial Magistrate of the First-Class.

79-C. Recovery of moneys due to religious institution, as arrears of land revenue.- Without prejudice to any other mode of recovery which is being taken or may be taken under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, any moneys due to a religious institution may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue and for the purposes of such recovery, the Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Administration) Department or any officer not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner authorised by the Commissioner in this behalf, shall have the powers of a Collector under the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (Tamil Nadu Act II of 1864)."

109. Central Act 36 of 1963 not to apply for recovery of properties of religious institution.- Nothing contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963) shall apply to any suit for possession of immovable property belonging to any religious institution or for possession of any interest in such property."

10. Chapter VII of the H.R. & C.E. Act deals with Encroachments. Sections 78, 79, 79-A & 79-B were brought into the statute book on 9.12.1996 by Tamil Nadu Act 39 of 1996. As per Section 78(1), the Assistant Commissioner having jurisdiction either suo motu or upon a complaint made by the trustee has reason to believe that any person has encroached upon the property belonging to the religious institution, he should report the fact with particulars to the Joint Commissioner. The Explanation to Section 78(1) makes it amply clear the expression 'encroacher' as per which any person who is in occupation of property without the approval of the competent authority and who continues to remain in property after the expiry or termination or cancellation of the lease is termed as 'encroacher'. After the report received from the Assistant Commissioner under sub-section (1) of Section 78, the Joint Commissioner if comes to a conclusion that there is a prima facie case of encroachment, he shall cause a notice, in a prescribed form, calling upon him to show cause requiring him to remove the encroachment before the date specified in the notice. Thereafter, after considering the objections if any, and after conducting an inquiry, if he satisfies that there has been an encroachment, after recording such reasons, he is required to remove the encroachment and deliver possession of the property. This is the procedure contemplated under Section 78 of the HR & CE Act for removal of the encroachers.

11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants / petitioner in one voice have contended that the appellants / petitioner are not the encroachers as described in Section 78 since they have been in possession of the religious institution for several decades and they are paying rent for their occupation. However, in course of hearing, they have admitted that their occupation as tenants / lessees is not by way of any lease / mortgage / licence. When the occupation of the appellants / petitioner is without the approval of the competent authority, they fall under the category (a) of the Explanation to Section 78(1) and they can only be termed as encroachers. Even assuming that some of the appellants have been admitted as tenants / lessees as per lease agreement, even then, when such lease or tenancy has expired or terminated or cancelled and they continue to remain in the property, they come under the category of (b) to be called as encroachers. There is no material on record to show that any person has been put in possession of the land belonging to the religious institution as a tenant / lessee. In the absence of any material on record, we have no other option then to come to a conclusion that the appellants / petitioner are encroachers.

12. When such a conclusion is arrived at, then the procedure contemplated under Section 78(2) and (4) has to follow, that is to say, the Joint Commissioner has to issue the show cause notice for removal of encroachment and thereafter considering the objections and conducting an enquiry, after recording the reasons has to pass an order of eviction. The Joint Commissioner could not pass an order according to his whims and fancies. Before passing the order of eviction, he has to consider the objections raised by the encroachers and should conduct an enquiry after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties and, after recording the reasons for coming to such a conclusion, he has to pass the order.

13. Ms. Chitra Sampath, learned counsel for the appellant in W.A.No.849 of 2009, in this context, has contended that any order of eviction passed by the Joint Commissioner is the final and no injunction would be granted by any Court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Joint Commissioner under Section 78.

14. It is true that Section 79(4) of the Act is a bar for the Civil Court in entertaining any suit or granting any injunction in respect of the proceedings taken by the Joint Commissioner under Section 78. But, a reading of the entire Section 79 makes it clear that the bar is for the encroachers not to approach the Civil Court, but not the person who is under lawful possession by way of lease / license. Therefore, the bar is for the persons who continues to remain in the property after the expiry or termination or cancellation of the lease, mortgage or licence granted to him. Hence, it cannot be said that the procedure contemplated under Section 78 is repugnant to the procedure contemplated under Section 79.

15. Moreover, as contended by the learned counsel, the order of the Joint Commissioner is not final. Section 21 of the HR & CE Act empowers the Commissioner to call for records and examine the record of any Joint or Deputy or Assistant Commissioner and take a decision or pass an order by modifying, annulling, reversing or remitting for reconsideration the order of the Joint Commissioner. Therefore, it is not as if the order of the Joint Commissioner is final. Moreover, Section 114 contemplates review of the order passed by the Commissioner under Section 21. Section 114(2) provides for stay of the execution of any such decision or order passed by the Commissioner/Addl. Commissioner. Further, Section 115-A gives the power of Review to the Government. Even when the competent authorities fail to follow the mandate of sect ion 78, judicial review under Article 226 is always available to the appellants. Therefore, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants it is not as if the parties are not without any remedy. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India [(1990) 4 SCC 594], the Supreme Court has observed that irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review, the recording of reasons by an administrative authority by itself serves a salutary purpose and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Ultimately, the Supreme Court observed that the remedy of judicial review under Article 226 is an adequate protection against arbitrary action in the matter of exercise of power by the appropriate Government or authority. Therefore, as contended by the learned counsel court is not powerless to interfere with the finding of the authorities, when such finding is arbitrary or illegal.

16. Ms. Chitra Sampath has specifically contended that the notice under Section 78(2) has been issued to the appellant alone and not to the similarly situated persons, though such appellant continues to pay the rent till date. She has also contended that since the appellant is paying the rent and he is willing to deposit the enhanced rent as fixed by the authorities, his possession may be legalised.

17. In all these cases, only notice under Section 78(2) has been issued. It is not the case of the appellants / petitioner that they had submitted their objections or they had participated in the inquiry as contemplated under 78(4). When no objections had been given or raised, how the Joint Commissioner would be in a position to pass an order. Whether the appellants are paying rents as contended by them or they have been in possession under any lease / licence or whether such lease / licence had expired or terminated or renewed are all the material facts to be decided by the Joint Commissioner before passing an order of eviction. If the original authority fails to consider the case on merits, the Commissioner can exercise its power under Section 21 to nullify such order and the Review power is available before the Government and, further, the judicial review is always there. Therefore, taking into consideration the fact that the appellants had approached this Court at a premature stage i.e., at the stage of issuance of notice, we are not in a position to entertain the contention of the learned counsel that Sections 78 and 79 are ultra vires and unconstitutional. It is also made clear that the Department should not misuse the power granted under the amended Sections by taking vindictive action on a particular person and the action taken should not be in a discriminatory manner.

18. In view of the above, the appellants / petitioner are directed to submit their explanation for the show cause notice issued by the Joint Commissioner within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment and, thereafter, six weeks time is granted for the Department to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The appellants are at liberty to raise all contentions now raised before the Joint Commissioner and it goes without saying that while passing the order the Joint Commissioner has to take into consideration the objections raised by the parties concerned.

19. So far as the contention relating to introduction of Section 109 of the HR & CE Act is concerned, we uphold the amendment brought into existence by way of Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 28 of 2003. As rightly held by the learned single Judge since Section 109 is only akin to Section 10 of the Limitation Act, no exception could be taken for the removal of limitation for taking action in restoring the temple properties. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel in this aspect are not applicable to the facts of the present case.

20. Coming to the contention raised by Mr.T.L., Rammohan, Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.20487 of 2000 to the effect that the petitioner as well as the appellants would come under the provisions of Section 34 and not under Section 78, it has to be stated that the petitioner would not come under the purview of Section 34. Before dealing with the decision relied on by the Senior Counsel in support of such contention, it would be appropriate to extract Section 34, which is as follows :-

"34. Alienation of immovable trust property.- (1) Any exchange, sale or mortgage and any lease for a term exceeding five years of any immovable property, belonging to, or given or endowed for the purposes of any religious institution shall be null and void unless it is sanctioned by the Commissioner as being necessary or beneficial to the institution:
Provided that before such sanction is accorded, the particulars relating to the proposed transaction shall be published in such manner as may be prescribed, inviting objections and suggestions with respect thereto; and all objections and suggestions received from the trustee or other persons having interest shall be duly considered by the Commissioner:
Provided further that the Commissioner shall not accord such sanction without the previous approval of the Government.
Explanation.- Any lease of the property above mentioned though for a term not exceeding five years shall, if it contains a provision for renewal for a further term (so as to exceed five years in the aggregate), whether subject to any condition or not, be deemed to be a lease for a period exceeding five years."

21. Section 34 enables the Commissioner to grant lease or accord sanction in respect of the any religious institution for a term not exceeding five years, after inviting objections and suggestions with respect thereto, of course with the approval of the Government. While granting such lease, he may give certain direction regarding the utilisation of the amount raised by the transaction. Section 34-A deals with the fixation of lease rent, which shall be fixed by a Committee consisting of the Joint Commissioner, the Executive Officer or the Trustee or the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the religious institution and the District Registrar of the Registration Department in the district concerned taking into account the prevailing market rental value and the guidelines. Section 34-B relates to termination of the lease granted by the Commissioner under Section 34.

22. In the decision reported in (2007) 4 MLJ 1002 (cited supra), the facts are entirely different. In the reported case, the Department has admitted that the petitioner was in possession of the suit schedule property and initiated revenue recovery proceedings for recovery of the arrears of rent by filing the suit and, therefore, the Division Bench considering the subsistence of the lease, which was admitted by the Department, held that recovery of the property from the lessee was not in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Section 34-B of the Act. In the present case, the appellants / petitioner are not in possession of the property by way of any lease / licence and they are found to be the encroachers and, therefore, the decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel is not applicable.

23. In the above context, Mr.T.V. Ramanujan, learned Senior Counsel and Ms. Chitra Sampath appearing for the appellant in W.A.No.849 of 2009 contended that though the Act was amended by Act 25 of 2003 on 10.5.2003, the Commissioner has not taken any steps to grant any lease to the persons who are in occupation for several decades and, therefore, they should not be treated as encroachers as contemplated under Section 78 of the HR & CE Act.

24. Though the learned counsel for the appellants and the petitioner have vehemently contended that the authorities / State have not taken any steps to execute the lease deed, they have not produced any material to show that they have made any representations to the authorities or the Government requesting them to execute the lease deed as contemplated under Section 34 or to fix the rent as provided under Section 34-A. In the absence of any material on the side of the appellants, we are not able to accept the aforesaid contention of the appellants.

25. When this Court has put the question to the learned Addl. Advocate General as to whether any lease agreement has been entered upon by the Commissioner and approved by the Government after coming into existence of Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 2003 from 10.5.2003, no satisfactory explanation has come from him. Neither the learned Addl. Advocate General nor the learned counsel for the Department is in a position to place any material to show any lease agreement has been executed after the Act has been amended and what are the steps taken or the proceedings issued in this regard. Therefore, it is apparent that the State Government or it s officers, who are at the helm of affairs of the Temples, have not taken any steps to enter into lease deeds as contemplated under Sections 34, 34-A, 34-B or 34-C of the HR & CE Act after the amendment Act has come into force. It is a sorry state of affairs to mention that the State Government / HR & CE are not serious in protecting the property of the religious institutions and the snail-paced action would not help in any way from recovering the property of the religious institutions from the hands of the encroachers.

26. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the reply made by the learned Addl. Advocate General, as the responsibility to protect the temple properties vests with the Court, we hereby direct the Commissioner, H R & CE Department as well as the State to immediately implement the provisions of Section 34 by executing lease deeds after fixing appropriate rent as per the prevailing market rate and the guideline value within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.

27. In the result, all the writ appeals and the writ petitions fail and the same are dismissed, subject to the directions given in paras 17 and 25 of this judgment. There would be no order as to costs.

							(E.D.R.,J)   (D.H.P.,J)
								 09-12-2011
Index    : Yes
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ELIPE DHARMA RAO, J
and
D. HARIPARANTHAMAN, J




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COMMON JUDGMENT IN
WA.Nos.849/2009 & batch
















09-12-2011

 



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Adivaram Varthagargal Sangam vs The State Of Tamil Nadu Rep on 28 October, 2008

Author: K. Chandru

Bench: K. Chandru

       

  

  

 
 
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED :  28.10.2008

C O R A M  :

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K. CHANDRU

W.P.Nos.10447, 14377 to 14381, 14388 to
14391, 15358, 15359, 983 of 1999

Adivaram Varthagargal Sangam
Palani, rep.by its Secretary,
Era.Vetrivel Chezhiyan,
60, Sannadhi Street, Adivaram,
Palani Post, Dindigul District.               .. Petitioner in WP.10447/1999

Rajendra Mudaliar			      .. Petitioner in WP.14377/1999

Peter Alphonse				      .. Petitioner in WP.14378/1999

Dr.M.Balamuralikrishna		      .. Petitioner in WP.14379/1999

T.C.A.Srinivasan				      .. Petitioner in WP.14380/1999

Charumathi Purushotham		      .. Petitioner in WP.14381/1999

K.Kuppuswamy			               .. Petitioner in WP.14388/1999

Sulochana Sadasivan		               .. Petitioner in WP.14389/1999

Sitha Govindan			               .. Petitioner in WP.14390/1999

M.L.Gupta					      .. Petitioner in WP.14391/1999

Jitendra Sharma				      ..Petitioner in WP.Nos.15358 &
							15359 of 1999

R.Narayanan				      .. Petitioner in WP.983 of 1999
	-vs-

1. The State of Tamil Nadu rep.
      by its Secretary,
    CT & RE Department,
    Fort St.George, Chennai-9.

2. The Joint Commissioner,
    HR & CE Department, Madurai.

3. The Assistant Commissioner,
    HR & CE Department, Madurai.

4. The Executive Officer-cum-Joint
    Commissioner, rep. Arulmigu
    Dhandhayuthapani Thirukoil,
    Adivaram, Palani.		          ..Respondents in WP.10447/1999


1. The Commissioner,
    T.N.HR & CE Department,
    Chennai-34.

2. The Joint Commissioner,
    T.N. HR & CE Administration
    Department, Chennai-34.

3. The Assistant Commissioner,
    T.N.HR & CE Administration
    Department, Chennai-34.

4. The Executive Officer,
    Madhavaperumal Temple,
    Mylapore, Chennai-4.

5. The Inspector,
    T.N.Hindu Religious and Charitable
    Endowments, Administration Dept,
    Chennai-34.

6. State of Tamil Nadu, rep.by
    Secretary, Commercial Taxes and
    Religious Endowments, Secretariat,
    Chennai-9.

7. Secretary to Government of T.N.
    Law Department, Secretariat,
    Chennai-9.				  .. Respondents in WPs.14388 to
						    14391 of 1999, 14377 to 14381
						    15358 & 15359 of 1999

1. The State of Tamil Nadu rep.by
    Secretary, HR & CE Department,
    Fort St.George, Chennai-9.

2. The Commissioner,
    HR & CE Department,
    Nungambakkam High Road,
    Chennai-600 034.

3. The Joint Commissioner,
    HR & CE Department,
    Myladuthurai.

4. Arulmighu Padaleeswarar
    Devasthanam, rep.by its Executive
    Officer, Cuddalore-2.		    ... Respondents in WP.983/1999

PRAYER in WP.10447 of 1999 : Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a writ of  declaration  declaring that  section 79(3) of the Tamil Nadu HR & CE Act is repugnant to Section 79(2) of the Act and also unconstitutional and also to declare  sub-section (3) of Section 78, which has taken away                                              the grant of relief of injunction by any court, is also unconstitutional so far as the petitioner Sangam is concerned.

Original Prayer in WP.Nos.14388 to 14391, 14377 to 14381, 15358, 15359 and 983 of 1999 : Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a writ of  declaration  declaring the provisions contained under Sections 78 and 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Act 22 of 1959 as amended by Act 39 of 1996 as ultra vires the Constitution of India and null and void in so far as the petitioner is concerned.

Amended Prayer in WP.Nos.15359, 14388, 14389, 15358, 14380, 14377, 14391 and 14379 of 1999 : Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a writ of  declaration  declaring the provisions contained under Sections 78 and 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Act 22 of 1959 as amended by Act 39 of 1996 as well as amended by Act 28 of 2003 as ultra vires the Constitution of India and null and void in so far as the petitioner is concerned.

		For petitioner in
		WP.10447 of 1999 		:: Mr.V.Raghupathy for 
						 	   Mr.K.N.Pandian
		For petitioner in
		WP.14388 to 14391/1999 &   
		WP.14377 to 14381/1999 &
		WP.15358 & 15359/1999     :: Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, SC for
							  Mr.R.Kannan

		For petitioner in
		WP.983 of 1999		        :: Mrs.Chitra Sampath
		For respondents in
		WP.10447 of 1999 	        ::  Mr.S.Ramasamy, AAG 
							     assisted by
							   Mr.T.Chandrasekaran,
							   Spl.G.P. For HR & CE for 
							   RR1 to 3
						      	   Mr.M.Sriram for R4
		For respondents in
		WP.14388 to 14391/1999 &   
		WP.14377 to 14381/1999 &
		WP.15358 & 15359/1999     :: Mr.S.Ramasamy, AAG 
							    assisted by
							  Mr.T.Chandrasekaran,
							  Spl.G.P. For HR & CE for
							  RR1 to 3, 5 & 6
							  Mrs.K.M.Nalinishree for R4
							  Mr.A.Arumugam, Spl.G.P.
							    For R7
		For respondents in
		WP.983 of 1999		        :: Mr.S.Ramasamy, AAG 
							    assisted by
							  Mr.T.Chandrasekaran,
							  Spl.G.P. For HR & CE for
							    RR1 to 3 
							  Mr.K.Chandrasekaran- R4
 
*****

O R D E R

These writ petitions challenge the constitutional validity of Sections 78, 79(3) and 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Act 22 of 1959) (for short, 'the HR & CE Act') as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 39 of 1996 as well as by Act 28 of 2003 as ultra vires the Constitution. For the sake of convenience, sections 78, 79 and 109 of the HR & CE Act, as amended, may be extracted below:-

''Section 78 : Encroachment by persons on land or building belonging to charitable or religious institution or endowment and the eviction of encroachers.- (1) Where the Assistant Commissioner having jurisdiction either suo motu or upon a complaint made by the trustee has reason to believe that any person has encroached upon (hereinafter in this section referred to as ''encroacher) any land, building, tank, well, spring or water-course or any space wherever situation belonging to the religious institution or endowment (hereinafter referred to as ''the property), he shall report the fact together with relevant particulars to the Joint Commissioner having jurisdiction over the division in which the religious institution or endowment is situated.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, the expression ''encroacher shall mean any person who unauthorisedly occupies any tank, well, spring or water-course or any property and to include-
(a) any person who is in occupation of property without the approval of the competent authority (sanctioning lease or mortgage or licence) and
(b) any person who continues to remain in the property after the expiry or termination or cancellation of the lease, mortgage or licence granted to him.
(2) Where, on a perusal of the report received by him under sub-section (1), the Joint Commissioner finds that there is a prima facie case of encroachment, he shall cause to be served upon the encroacher a notice specifying the particulars of the encroachment and calling on him to show cause before a certain date why an order requiring him to remove the encroachment before the date specified on the notice should not be made. A copy of the notice shall also be sent to the trustees of the religious institution or endowment concerned.
(3) The notice referred to in sub-section (2) shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed.
(4) Where after considering the objections, if any, of the encroacher received during the period specified in the notice referred to in sub-section (2) and after conducting such inquiry as may be prescribed, the Joint Commissioner is satisfied that there has been an encroachment, he may by order and for reasons to be recorded, require the encroacher to remove the encroachment and deliver possession of the property (land or building or space) encroached upon to the trustee before the date specified in such order.
(5) During the pendency of the proceeding, the Joint Commissioner shall order the encroacher to deposit such amount as may be specified by him in consideration of the use and occupation of the properties in question in the manner prescribed.
79. Mode of eviction on failure of removal of the encroachment as directed by the Joint Commissioner.- Where within the period specified in the order under sub-section (4) of section 78, the encroacher has not removed the encroachment and has not vacated the property, the Assistant Commissioner having jurisdiction over the division may remove the encroachment and obtain possession of the property encroached upon, taking such police assistance as may be necessary. Any Police Officer whose help is required for this purpose shall render necessary help to the Assistant Commissioner.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent any person aggrieved by the order of the Joint Commissioner under sub-section (4) of section 78 from instituting a suit in a Court to establish that the religious institution or endowment has no title to the property.

Provided that no Civil Court shall take cognizance of any suit instituted after six months from the date of receipt of the order under sub-section (4) of section 78.

Provided further that no such suit shall be instituted by a person who is let into possession of the property or who is a lessee, licensee or mortgagee, of the religious institution or endowment.

(3) No injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Joint Commissioner under section 78.

79-A. Encroachment by group of persons on land belonging to charitable religious institutions and their eviction.- (1) Where the Joint Commissioner knows or has reason to believe that a group or groups of persons without any entitlement and with the common object of occupying any land, which is the property belonging to a charitable or religious institution or endowment, are occupying or have occupied any such land and if such group or groups of persons have not vacated the land on demand by the Joint Commissioner or any officer authorised by him in this behalf, the Joint Commissioner shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, order after giving due notice, the immediate eviction of the encroachers from the land and the taking of possession of the land and thereupon, it shall be lawful for any officer authorised by the Joint Commissioner in this behalf to evict the encroachers from the land by force, taking such police assistance as may be necessary and take possession of the land. Any police officer whose help is required for this purpose shall be bound to render the necessary help to the Joint Commissioner or to such officer authorised by him.

(2) Where, in any proceedings taken under this section, or in consequence of anything done under this section, a question arises as to whether any land is the property of the charitable or religious institution or endowment, such land shall be presumed to be the property of the charitable or religious institution or endowment until the contrary is proved by the encroacher.

(3) Any order of eviction passed by the Joint Commissioner under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court.

79-B. Penalty for offences in connection with encroachment.- (1) No person, on or after the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Amendment) Act, 1996 (Tamil Nadu Act 39 of 1996) shall occupy, otherwise than by lawful possession, any property belonging to a charitable or religious institution or endowment.

(2) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1), shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.

(3) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sub-section (2) except on the complaint in writing of the Commissioner.

(4) No offence punishable under sub-section (2) shall be inquired into or tried by any Court inferior to that of a Judicial Magistrate of the First-Class.

79-C. Recovery of moneys due to religious institution, as arrears of land revenue.- Without prejudice to any other mode of recovery which is being taken or may be taken under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, any moneys due to a religious institution may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue and for the purposes of such recovery, the Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Administration) Department or any officer not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner authorised by the Commissioner in this behalf, shall have the powers of a Collector under the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (Tamil Nadu Act II of 1864).

109. Central Act 36 of 1963 not to apply for recovery of properties of religious institution.- Nothing contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963) shall apply to any suit for possession of immovable property belonging to any religious institution or for possession of any interest in such property.

2. These three provisions provide for a mechanism for the religious institutions as defined under Section 6 (18) of the HR & CE Act to secure their properties from the encroachers and also for a speedy restoration of the properties without being driven to the forum of civil courts.

3. Before going into the merits of the stand taken by the parties, it is necessary to recapitulate two decisions of the Supreme Court which dealt with the need for the temple properties to be safeguarded. The Supreme Court in its decision in A.A.Gopalkrishnan Vs. Cochin Devaswom Board and others reported in 2007 (7) SCC 482, cautioned about the misuse of temple properties and the need to protect such properties. Speaking for the Court K.G.Balakrishnan, C.J., in paragraph.10 of the said judgment, it is observed as follows:

"10. The properties of deities, temples and Devaswom Boards, require to be protected and safeguarded by their trustees / archakas / shebaits / employees. Instances are many where persons entrusted with the duty of managing and safeguarding the properties of temples, deities and Devaswom Boards have usurped and misappropriated such properties by setting up false claims of ownership or tenancy, or adverse possession. This is possible only with the passive or active collusion of the authorities concerned. Such acts of "fences eating the crops" should be dealt with sternly. The Government, members or trustees of boards/trusts and devotees should be vigilant to prevent any such usurpation or encroachment. It is also the duty of courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation."

(Emphasis added)

 



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4. The Supreme Court in its decision reported in 2006(1) SCC 287, Joint Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Admn. Department Vs. Jayaraman and others restored the land to the temple which was sold by orders of the Court by filing application under Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act. The sale and the subsequent patta obtained were held to be invalid. While holding so, the Supreme Court forewarned attempts by certain people to corner the temple properties and therefore, the following passage found in para:12, may be reproduced below:-

"12. It is seen that there has been a clear attempt by the claimants to overreach the deities and the authorities under the HR & CE Act, while managing the properties dedicated for the purposes of the temple, properties granted and managed by them in their capacities as poojaris, for the maintenance of the temples. The attempt has to be deprecated."

5. These writ petitions ere admitted as early as in the year 1999. Pending the writ petitions, in many cases, stay of dispossession was given by this Court. In some cases, interim orders were refused. In W.P.No.10477 of 1999, it was directed that the respondents can evict the petitioner after adopting the procedure contemplated under the Act.

6. The ground of attack on the amendments made was that a class of persons have been carved out by the legislation, who are not allowed to avail the remedies by way of civil suit. The procedure provided under the Act is arbitrary and without guidelines. It is also stated that the executive authority has been given wide power, which is likely to be misused. While the land owners have been allowed to move the Civil Court, the other persons such as persons whose tenancy has not been renewed or who made developments in the properties on hiring the land belonging to the temple have been denied any relief under the Act. At the whims and fancies of the temple authorities or the Executive Officers, persons can be thrown out of possession. Against the order of the Joint Commissioner ordering eviction, there is no further appeal.

7. Further, the removal of limitation under section 109 of the HR & CE Act is also arbitrary. The Act also interferes with the rights conferred by the Transfer of Property Act. It is also further contended that no fair procedure has been evolved for evicting the persons from the properties.

8. The petitioners in W.P.Nos.14377 to 14381 and 14388 to 14391 of 1999 have also moved this Court by filing writ petitions in W.P.Nos.13873 to 13881, 15357 and 15360 of 1999 and sought for quashing the order issued under section 78(2) of the HR & CE Act by the Joint Commissioner, HR & CE Department, dated 16.9.1998. The grounds taken in those writ petitions were that they were the owners of the property and the notices issued were without jurisdiction. It was also stated that the temple in question, namely, Arulmighu Madava Perumal Temple, Mylapore had already filed a suit in C.S.No.796 of 1998 against those petitioners and since the petitioners were in possession, they cannot be called as encroachers. Therefore, it was directed by this Court that as the temple had initiated action against the petitioners in a Civil Suit after establishing their title and ownership, they can always evict the petitioners as encroachers. The common order dated 12.12.2006 passed by this court was taken on appeal by the Executive Officer of the Temple in W.A.Nos.487 to 490 and 511 to 517 of 2007. This Court confirmed the order of the learned Judge and dismissed the writ appeals. It is now stated that the suit in C.S.No.796 of 1998 is pending trial before the Civil Court.

9. Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, learned Senior Counsel submitted that he is not appearing for any encroachers. But, however, in case of persons who are lessees, licencees or mortgagees, whose lease, licence are not renewed, have been left high and dry by the aforesaid Act. But in a notice given under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, a person holding over cannot be called as an encroacher. The sweeping power under section 109 excluding the Limitation Act, 1963, will result in all old issues raked up and it cannot be based on sound public policy.

10. Mrs.Chitra Sampath, learned counsel representing some petitioners submitted that the power granted under section 78 is an arbitrary power. The authority cannot pass any orders independently in view of the definition of ''encroacher" found in section 78 of the said Act. The procedure contemplated under section 78(1) and 78(4) is an arbitrary procedure. Further, the prevention of moving the Civil Court under section 79(2) with a total bar under section 79(3) is illegal and it is not a fair procedure extended to tenants. Though she wanted to argue on the merits of the notice issued to her client in W.P.No.983 of 1999, the counsel was told that as she was challenging only the show-cause notice and if any final orders are passed pursuant to the show-cause notice, her client can renew the prayer.

11. Mr.V.Raghupahy, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.10447 of 1999 submitted that the prohibition contained under Section 79(3) was totally invalid and the power of the Civil Court in grant of injunction cannot be barred.

12. Per contra, Mr.S.Ramasamy, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the temple properties were exempted from the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Therefore, for evicting the squatters over the temple property, the temple authorities were made to move the Civil Court, which is not only time consuming and many a times, the very purpose of moving the Civil Court is frustrated by the dilatory tactics adopted by persons who are squatting over temple properties. The legislature by the amendment, while protected the interest of genuine land owners, made classification of encroachers and other persons who are not encroachers but are ex-lessees, licencees or mortgagees and dealt with them separately. While the encroachers are dealt under section 78, by section 79(2), the land owners are given power to move the Civil Court for establishing their title to the property. Section 79(3) only prohibits the Civil Court from granting injunction if any proceeding is taken or about to be taken by the Joint Commissioner under section 78. With reference to the persons who are already having lease or licence and had developed the properties, section 82 provides for compensation on account of such persons are made to lose their possession. Section 83 provides for a Tribunal, which has been established for the purpose of passing an Award fixing the compensation.

13. Mr.K.Chandrasekaran, learned counsel submitted that the exclusion of Limitation Act cannot be found fault with as similar provision is found in the Limitation Act, 1963 and particularly referred to Section 10 of the said Act, which reads as follows:-

10. Suits against trustees and their representatives.-

Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time.

Explanation. - For the purposes of this section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof."

14. He also submitted that section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not create any interest in the property. It is only a clause relating to termination of lease and after termination of the lease if any suit is initiated by the landlord, the termination cannot be questioned by the ex-lessee and they will have no real defence before the Civil Court. The petitioners are interested only in driving the parties to the Civil Court. Though such persons will not get the relief from the Civil Court but wanted to enjoy the benefit of interim order and delay the disposal of the suits. Only to rectify such an hardship by the religious institutions, the present amendments have been brought into force. He also drew the attention of this Court to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act, 1905 and the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, wherein also, only procedure has been set out for evicting the encroachers. The present amendment under Section 79 is only similar to such provisions and, hence, no exception can be taken to these provisions.

15. Mrs.Chitra Sampath, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in The State of Punjab and another -vs- Khan Chand (AIR 1974 SC 543) and relied on the passages found in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, which may be usefully extracted below:-

''5. Mr.Mahajan on behalf of the appellants has assailed the judgment of the High Court and has argued that the provisions of Section 2 of the Act do not contravene Article 14 of the Constitution. This contention, in our opinion, is not well founded. The relevant provisions of the Act have been reproduced above and from a perusal thereof we find that the Act confers uncontrolled power on the State Government or the officers authorised by it to requisition any movable property. The only property excluded from the purview of the Act is one used for the purpose of religious worship or an aircraft or anything forming part of an aircraft or connected with the operation, repair or maintenance of aircraft. No guidelines have been laid down in the Act regarding the object or the purpose for which the State Government or the officers authorised by it may consider it necessary or expedient to requisition a movable property. It is not even the requirement of the Act that the authority requisitioning movable property should specify in the order the purpose for which it has become necessary or expedient to requisition that property. There is no provision in the Act that the power of requisitioning movable property can be exercised under the Act only for a public purpose nor is there any provision that powers under the Act can be exercised only in an emergency or in some special contingency. It is open under the provisions of the Act for an officer authorised under the Act to requisition movable property for any purpose whatsoever. For example, it would be permissible under the provisions of the Act for the District Magistrate, who is an officer authorised under the Act, to requisition the furniture of anyone within the district for use in the office of the District Magistrate. Likewise, it would be permissible for the District Magistrate to requisition any private car which may have caught his fancy for his own use. It is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the District Magistrate would ever use his powers under the Act for such purposes. Suffice it to say that there is nothing in the provisions of the Act which makes it impermissible for a District Magistrate to requisition movable property for any purpose whatsoever for which he considers it necessary or expedient to do so.
6. The power conferred under the Act can be exercised not only by the State Government but also by the officers to whom it may be delegated by the State Government. There is nothing in the Act that the officer to whom the powers under the Act can be delegated must not be below a particular rank. The result is that the powers of requisitioning a movable property, which are of a most comprehensive nature, can be conferred even upon a petty officer. No suitable machinery is also provided in the Act for determining the compensation payable to the owner of the movable property nor does the Act contain any guiding principles for determining the amount of compensation. According to Section 4 of the Act, the compensation to be paid shall be such as the State Government may determine.
7. The drastic and unusual features of the Act which have been pointed out above highlight the fact that the Act confers arbitrary powers for requisitioning of movable property upon the authorities under the Act and that no guidelines whatsoever have been prescribed for the exercise of the powers of requisitioning. The total absence of guidelines for the exercise of power of requisitioning of movable property, in our opinion, vitiates Section 2 of the Act. Arbitrariness and the power to discriminate are writ large on the face of the said provision of the Act and, in our opinion, that provision falls within the mischief which Article 14 of the Constitution is designed to prevent. The fact that the impugned Act was enacted before the coming into force of the Constitution would not make any material difference. The protection afforded by Article 31(5) to pre-Constitution laws is against the challenge on the ground of contravention of Article 31(2); Article 31(5) gives no immunity to pre-Constitution laws from attack on the ground that they violate Article 14 of the Constitution".

16. The Supreme Court held that while the authorities have been given power to requisition movable properties, sufficient guidelines have not been given and such power is an arbitrary power. It is not clear as to how the said decision will have any relevance to the present case. Neither under the present amendment nor under any other provisions of the HR & CE Act, the State Government is empowered to deal with the properties of the religious institutions and complete autonomy is given for bona fide use of the properties of those institutions. Constitutional protection is guaranteed under Article 26 to safeguard the interest of the properties of such institutions. The present attempt in bringing the amendment is only to plug the loopholes in the procedural right of temples in securing their properties. Instead of driving them to the forum of civil court, which is admittedly time consuming and are misused by the dilatory tactics adopted by persons who are squatters in the properties of the religious institution. The amendments which are attacked are only procedural in character and it provides a forum for securing the properties of the temple. It is not as if the legislature lacks competence in bringing the law. Many a time, procedural safeguards including a forum to realize the properties have been conceived by various legislations in this regard.

17. In the present case, the attempt is to provide a forum for the religious institutions to retrieve its properties. Even bodies like Tamil Nadu Housing Board is empowered to evict the encroachers by resorting to Section 84 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act 1961. Therefore, the contention that the religious institutions being treated as a separate class was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be accepted.

18. Learned Additional Advocate General placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.Karunanidhi -vs- Union of India reported in AIR 1979 SC 898 and relied upon the following passage found in para 8 for the proposition that there is no repugnancy between the HR & CE Act and Transfer of Property Act and it may be usefully extracted below:-

''8. It would be seen that so far as clause (1) of Article 254 is concerned it clearly lays down that where there is a direct collision between a provision of a law made by the State and that made by Parliament with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the pro-visions of clause (2), the State law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy. This naturally means that where both the State and Parliament occupy the field contemplated by the Concurrent List then the Act passed by Parliament being prior in point of time will prevail and consequently the State Act will have to yield to the Central Act. In fact, the scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the State Legislatures. First, regarding the matters contained in List I, i.e. the Union List to the Seventh Schedule, Parliament alone is empowered to legislate and the State Legislatures have no authority to make any law in respect of the Entries contained in List I. Secondly, so far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both Parliament and the State Legislatures are entitled to legislate in regard to any of the Entries appearing therein, but that is subject to the condition laid down by Article 254(1) discussed above. Thirdly, so far as the matters in List II, i.e. the State List are concerned, the State Legislatures alone are competent to legislate on them and only under certain conditions Parliament can do so. It is, therefore, obvious that in such matters repugnancy may result from the following circumstances:
1. Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy.
2. Where however a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254.
3. Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of the State List and entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential.
4. Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 254.

19. On the question of introduction of Section 109 of HR & CE Act, the learned Additional Advocate General placed reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court, which decision though rendered in a civil proceeding, dealt with the scope of section 109. Para 6 of the judgment in Sri Raghavendra Swami Mutt rep.by its Hereditary Trustee and Madathipathi Sri Seeshmendra K.Lakshminarayanan -vs- Panchapakesa Iyer reported in (2004) 4 M.L.J. 727 may be usefully extracted below:

''6. Limitation.: The first question that arisen for consideration is whether the suit is barred by limitation. The deed of lease was executed on 16.2.1946. Admittedly, Sri Raghavendra Swamy Mutt is a Hindu religious institution and the properties belong to the said religious institution. Section 109 of the HR & CE Act, 1959, as it stood when the suit was instituted, saved from the operation of the law of limitation for a suit for the recovery of property belonging to the religious institution which did not vest in a person before 30.9.1951. In other words, Section 109 of the HR & CE Act provided that it is not open to a person to claim adverse possession against the property belonging to the religious institution unless he has pleaded and proved that the property belonging to the religious institution was in his possession adverse to the claim of the said religious institution and the property also vested in him prior to 30.9.1951. The deed of lease, admittedly, was entered into on 16.2.1946 and even the present defendant on his predecessors-in-title could not have claimed adverse possession in the suit property as he was in the property for less than five years as on 30.9.1951 and the present suit is not barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act. A similar view was taken by a learned Judge of this Court in Rajanarayanaperumal Temple -vs- Rethinam Pillai (`1979) 1 MLJ 159, where the learned Judge held that Section 109 of the HR & CE Act is a special provision regarding the law of limitation and that would prevail over the general provisions contained in the Limitation Act and by 30.9.1951 if twelve year period had not elapsed from the date of transfer of the property belonging to the religious institution and the property did not vest in the defendant, the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply and the religious institution is entitled to file a suit for recovery of possession of the property belonging to the said religious institution. We hold that suit instituted by the plaintiff is not barred by limitation."

20. To counter the plea of hardship caused to the petitioners by the impugned legislation as contended by the counsel for petitioners, the learned Additional Advocate General placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. -vs- Maddula Ratnavalli and others reported in (2007) 6 SCC 81 and referred to the following passages found in paragraphs 18 and 19, which may be usefully extracted below:-

''18. We are, however, not oblivious of the legal principle that only because a statute causes hardship, the same may not be declared ultra vires (dura lex sed lex). We may, in this regard, notice certain principles.
19. In Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank3 it is stated: (SCC pp. 241-42, para 29) 29. Learned counsel for the respondent Bank submitted that it will be very unfair if the appellant who is a guarantor of the loan, and Director of the Company which took the loan, avoids paying the debt. While we fully agree with the learned counsel that equity is wholly in favour of the respondent Bank, since obviously a bank should be allowed to recover its debts, we must, however, state that it is well settled that when there is a conflict between law and equity, it is the law which has to prevail, in accordance with the Latin maxim dura lex sed lex, which means the law is hard, but it is the law. Equity can only supplement the law, but it cannot supplant or override it.

 



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 21. He also submitted that the temple is represented by its idol and it is in a position of a ''minor" and the Court should be astute to protect the interests of an idol in any litigation. For this purpose, reliance was placed upon a judgment of this Court in Sri Madhavaperumal Devasthanam, Mylapore, Madras-4 represented by Executive Officer -vs- Tmt.Dhanalakshmi & Others reported in 1996-1-L.W.231 and the following passage in para 4 may be usefully reproduced below:-

''4. It should not be forgotten that an idol is in the position of a minor. It has been held in Bishwanath -vs- Radha Ballabhji (AIR 1967 SC 1044) that an idol is in the position of a minor and when the person representing it leaves it in lurch, a person interested in the worship of the idol can certainly be clothed with an adhoc power of representation to protect its interest. The principle would certainly apply in a case where the persons in management of a temple have not been as diligent as is necessary in conducting a litigation on behalf of the temple. The court can take notice of the fact that Executive Officers who are put in charge of the temple are changed periodically and in many a case, they do not get fully acquainted with the history or affairs of the temple. If there is some slackness on the part of the Executive Officer or even the trustees of the temple, it is the duty of the Court to see that the idol does not suffer thereby. Courts should be astute to protect the interests of an idol in any litigation."

22. In the light of the rival submissions, the validity of the provisions will have to be gone into. In more or less on such identical issues raised before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court while challenging the vires of Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act,the Supreme Court repelled such contentions in the case relating to Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. & others v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and another, reported in (1992) 3 SCC 336. While answering the questions raised before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court noted four main contentions. Of those contentions, three contentions and the answers given by the Supreme Court are relevant for the present case. Therefore, the first three contentions as found in para 36 of the judgment and the relevant passages in which the answers were given are extracted below:-

Contention No.1:
Adjudication by a judicial body available in the case of retrenchment under Section 25-F has been substituted by an administrative order passed by an executive authority in the case of retrenchment under Section 25-N and thereby a function which was traditionally performed by Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts has been conferred on an executive authority.
Answer : (para 39) Insofar as the first part of the contention is concerned, it may be stated that, while construing the provisions of sub-section (2), we have held that the power to grant or refuse permission for retrenchment of workmen that has been conferred under sub-section (2), has to be exercised on an objective consideration of the relevant facts after affording an opportunity to the parties having an interest in the matter and reasons have to be recorded in the order that is passed. We have referred to Rule 76-A of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules and Form P-A prescribed under the said rules for the notice to be served under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 25-N, and the particulars which are required to be supplied by the employer under the various heads in the said notice. The enquiry, which has to be made under sub-section (2) before an order granting or refusing permission for retrenchment of workmen is passed, would require an examination of the said particulars and other material that is furnished by the employer as well as the workmen. In view of the time-limit of three months prescribed in sub-section (3) there is need for expeditious disposal which may not be feasible if the proceedings are conducted before a judicial officer accustomed to the judicial process. Moreover during the course of such consideration it may become necessary to explore the steps that may have to be taken to remove the causes necessitating the proposed retrenchment which may involve interaction between the various departments of the Government. This can be better appreciated and achieved by an executive officer rather than a judicial officer. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the first part of the contention relating to conferment of the power to grant or refuse the permission for retrenchment on the appropriate Government.
Contention No.2:
No guidelines have been prescribed for the exercise of the power by the appropriate Government or authority under sub-section (2) of Section 25-N and it would be permissible for the authority to pass its order on policy considerations which may have nothing to do with an individual employers legitimate need to re-organise its business. The requirement that reasons must be recorded by the appropriate Government or authority for its order under sub-section (2) of Section 25-N is not a sufficient safeguard against arbitrary action since no yardstick is laid down for judging the validity of those reasons.
Answer: (Para 42) It has been urged on behalf of the employers that sub-section (2) of Section 25-N does not prescribe any guidelines or principles to govern the exercise of the power that has been conferred on the appropriate Government or the authority in the matter of grant or refusal of permission for retrenchment and in the absence of such guidelines or principles, it will be open to the appropriate Government or authority to take into account matters having no bearing or relevance to the legitimate need of the employer to re-organise his business and which may even be opposed to such need and it has been pointed that it would be permissible to pass the order by taking into consideration the state of unemployment in the industry or the state of unemployment in the State. It has also been submitted that the requirement that reasons should be recorded in the order that is passed by the appropriate Government or authority would not provide any protection against arbitrary action because in the absence of principles governing the exercise of the power, there is no touchstone to assess the validity of those reasons. We find no substance in this contention. We have already dealt with the nature of the power that is exercised by the appropriate Government or the authority while refusing or granting permission under sub-section (2) and have found that the said power is not purely administrative in character but partakes of exercise of a function which is judicial in nature. The exercise of the said power envisages passing of a speaking order on an objective consideration of relevant facts after affording an opportunity to the concerned parties. Principles or guidelines are insisted on with a view to control the exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. There is need for such principles or guidelines when the discretionary power is purely administrative in character to be exercised on the subjective opinion of the authority. The same is, however, not true when the power is required to be exercised on objective considerations by a speaking order after affording the parties an opportunity to put forward their respective points of view. That apart, it cannot be said that no guidance is given in the Act in the matter of exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 25-N. Contention No.3 :
There is no provision for appeal or revision against the order passed by the appropriate Government or authority refusing to grant permission to retrench under sub-section (2) of Section 25-N. Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is not an adequate remedy.
Answer : (Paras 49 and 55) We are also unable to agree with the submission that the requirement of passing a speaking order containing reasons as laid down in sub-section (2) of Section 25-N does not provide sufficient safeguard against arbitrary action. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594) it has been held that irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review, the recording of reasons by an administrative authority by itself serves a salutary purpose, viz., it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making (SCC p. 612, para 36).
The remedy of judicial review under Article 226 is, in our view, an adequate protection against arbitrary action in the matter of exercise of power by the appropriate Government or authority under sub-section (2) of Section 25-N of the Act. The third contention is, therefore, rejected.

23. The amendments made to the HR & CE Act cannot be held to be ultra vires based upon comparative provisions found in other laws such as Transfer of Property Act etc. and such an argument is impermissible. In State of M.P. -vs- G.C.Mandawar (1955) 1 SCR 599: AIR 1954 SC 493, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of the law of one State on the ground that in contrast with the law of another State on the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory, nor does it contemplate the law of the Centre or of a State dealing with similar subjects being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions of the two. The sources of authority for the two being different, Article 14 can have no application.

24. In Sant Lal Bharati V. State of Punjab (1988) 1 SCC 366: (1988) 2 SCR 107., the Supreme Court reiterated the same view.

25. In State of Tamil Nadu and others Vs. Ananthi Ammal and others, reported in 1995(1) S.C.C.519 the Supreme Court while dealing with a similar subject, in para:7, observed as follows:-

"7. When a statute is impugned under Article 14 what the Court has to decide is whether the statue is so arbitrary or unreasonable that it must be struck down. At best, a statute upon a similar subject which derives its authority from another source can be referred to, if its provisions have been held to be reasonable or have stood the test of time, only for the purpose of indicating what may be said to be reasonable in the context."

26. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Meenakshi Mills case (cited supra) laid down guide lines for dealing with vires of statute and quoted the dictum of Patanjali Sastri. C.J. in State of Madras Vs. V.G.Row reported in 1952 SCR 597 and recorded the same as the classic exposition of law on the subject. The said passage is found in page 358 of the report in V.G.Row's case (cited supra) and it may be usefully extracted below:-

"It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable."

27. Further, the Supreme Court in Papnasam Labour Union Vs. Madura Coats Ltd and another reported in (1995) 1 SCC 501 dealt with the principles and guidelines that should be kept in mind for considering the constitutionality of a statutory provision upon a challenge on the alleged vires or unreasonableness of the restriction imposed by the said legislation. In doing so, the Supreme Court surveyed all its previous decisions and culled out those guidelines along with its sources. They are found in Para:15 of the judgment and it may be worth quoting:-

''(a). The restriction sought to be imposed on the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the requirement of felt need of the society and object sought to be achieved. (Chintaman Rao V. State of M.P. 1950 SCR 759).
(b). There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection between the restriction imposed and the object sought to be achieved. (O.K.Ghosh V.E.X.Joseph, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 812) (c). No abstract or fixed principle can be laid down which may have universal application in all cases. Such consideration on the question of quality of reasonableness, therefore, is expected to vary from case to case.(Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni V. State of Madras & Kerala).
(d). In interpreting constitution provisions, courts should be alive to the felt need of the society and complex issues facing the people which the Legislature intends to solve through effective legislation. (Jyoti Pershad V. Administrator for Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602.)
(e) In appreciating such problems and felt need of the society the judicial approach must necessarily be dynamic, pragmatic and elastic.(Jyoti Pershad V. Administrator for Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602.)
(f) It is imperative that for consideration of reasonableness of restriction imposed by a statute, the Court should examine whether the social control as envisaged in Article 19 is being effectuated by the restriction imposed on the Fundamental Rights.(State of Madras V. V.G.Row, AIR 1952 SC 196).
(g) Although Article 19 guarantees all the seven freedoms to the citizen, such guarantee does not confer any absolute or unconditional right but is subject to reasonable restriction which the Legislature may impose in public interest. It is therefore necessary to examine whether such restriction is meant to protect social welfare satisfying the need of prevailing social values. (State of Madras V. V.G.Row, AIR 1952 SC 196).
(h) The reasonableness has got to be tested both from the procedural and substantive aspects. It should not be bound by processual perniciousness or jurisprudence of remedies. (Fatehchand Himmatlal V. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 670.
(j) Restriction imposed on the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution must not be arbitrary, unbridled, uncanalised and excessive and also not unreasonably discriminatory. Ex hypothesi, therefore, a restriction to be reasonable must also be consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution. (k) In judging the reasonableness of the restriction imposed by clause (6) of Article 19, the Court has to bear in mind Directive Principles of State Policy. (Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
(l) Ordinarily, any restriction so imposed which has the effect of promoting or effectuating a directing principles can be presumed to be a reasonable restriction in public interest. (Workmen V. Meenakshi Mills Ltd (1992) 3 SCC 336".

28. Therefore, in the light of the above legal precedents, it must be stated that the challenge to the amendment made in this writ petition cannot be countenanced by this Court and are liable to be rejected. The Amendment Act has validly classified the encroachers, other interest holders and title holders of the properties and has treated them differently. In respect of the encroachers, a procedural right of hearing has been given. The Joint Commissioner, HR & CE, who is the competent authority, first of all must have information before him so that he can have 'reason to believe' that a person had encroached upon the property of a religious institution. Thereafter he should 'prima facie' come to the conclusion that the person is an encroacher in terms of explanation to section 78(1). It is only on a prima facie conclusion he can order notice to the alleged encroachers as well as to the trustees of the religious institution. Section 78(4) gives three statutory mandate on the competent authority. They are that he should conduct such 'enquiry' as may be prescribed and he should be 'satisfied' that there was an encroachment and only by an order in which he has to 'record reasons' he can direct removal of such a person.

29. In case the competent authority fails to follow the mandate of section 78, judicial review under Article 226 is clearly available to such aggrieved persons. Therefore, even in the absence of any appeal, as directed by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Meenakshi Mills case, it is not as if parties are without remedies and they can move this Court under Article 226. Therefore, on this score this section cannot be held to be unconstitutional.

30. With reference to persons who have some interest such as ex-lessees, licencees or mortgagees, the Act did not leave them high and dry and for the developments made by them in the property in case they were deprived of it, section 82 provides for compensation to be determined by a Tribunal.

31. So far as the titleholders are concerned, Section 79(2) provides for approaching the civil court for establishing their title. The argument that section 79(3) bars grant of injunction is not a true statement of law. Section 79(2) bars only the proceedings taken under section 78 by which only an encroacher is given notice. Since the title holder of the property is protected by section 79 (2) and the said sub-section has a non-obstante clause, the Civil Court granting injunction is not barred under section 79(3). But, it is, however, subject to prima facie case or balance of convenience to be pleaded and proved to the satisfaction of such Civil Court.

32. Since section 109 is only akin to Section 10 of the Limitation Act, no exception can be taken about the removal of limitation for taking action to restore the temple properties. It is not as if there is no other legislation which do not provide limitation. To cite an example, a reference may be made to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

33. In view of the above foregoing, the challenge to the impugned provisions are not valid and they must necessarily fail. Accordingly, all the writ petitions stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.

28.10.2008 Index :yes/no Internet :yes/no js To

1. The Joint Commissioner, HR & CE Department, Madurai.

2. The Assistant Commissioner, HR & CE Department, Madurai.

3. The Executive Officer-cum-Joint Commissioner, representing Arulmigu Dhandhayuthapani Thirukoil, Adivaram, Palani.

4. The Joint Commissioner, T.N. HR & CE, Administration Department, Chennai-34.

5. The Assistant Commissioner, T.N.HR & CE Administration Department, Chennai-34.

6. The Executive Officer, Madhavaperumal Temple, Mylapore, Chennai-4.

7. The Inspector, T.N.Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Administration Dept, Chennai-34.

8. The Secretary to Government, Commercial Taxes and Religious Endowments Department, Fort St.George, Chennai-9.

9. The Secretary to Government of T.N. Law Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9.

10. The Commissioner, HR & CE Department, Nungambakkam High Road, Chennai-600 034.

11. The Joint Commissioner, HR & CE Department, Myladuthurai.

12. The Executive Officer, Arulmighu Padaleeswarar Devasthanam, Cuddalore-2.

K. CHANDRU, J.

js W.P.Nos.10447, 14388 to 14391, 14377 to 14381, 15358, 15359 and 983 of 28.10.2008



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